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Connectivity: From Asset to Liability and Loss
"This would be a scandal, if we listened to some and not to other [voices]...out of
whim, habit,...prejudice or political desire..." (Geertz 1988:6)
In this paper I reflect on some unusual and thought-provoking patterns in the analysis of
Palestinian political practices. Specifically, these patterns have materialised in response to
(and indeed in explanation of) dramatically transfigured Palestinian practices of political
"martyrdom" (Arabic, shehadat)--the notion has been an "actant" (Law 1999) in processes of
political mobilisation since the inception of a national liberation movement in the region (see
Johnson 1982)--during the 2001-2002 period. "Local political practice" thereby crossed the
Rubicon line beyond which it can no longer be imagined as keeping in line with the key
imaginaries and core values of neo-liberalising "international" movements which articulate
with such localised emancipatory struggles. My intention in this essay is to register the
analytical postures which the new (and shocking) political practices have elicited.
Specifically, I want to draw attention to a suspension of "everyday" or common
anthropological practices and its effect, namely, the obviation of local knowledge practices
which surround and undergird the line of action that is causing this frenzied search for
"explanations" and in which anthropologists participate with less than their usual
methodological and epistemological equipment. Is one to infer from this posture that
anthropology as such is fundamentally unfit to handle such forms of political agency which
are morally repugnant in the eyes of the "international community" ? Is ethnography not a
method equally suited to all phenomena? Do different political situations call for different
epistemologies? And if the answer is "no" to the first questions and "yes" to the second, then
which and whose instrumentality is setting the agenda?
Some background is in order. During the First Palestinian Intifada (1987-1993), the
main techniques of resistance against Israeli occupation of two decades had been acts of civil
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disobedience, measures of national institution-building, and militancy by stone-throwing.
"Martyrdom," although it had been an active ethos also during the First Intifada (which was
led by the progressive party-movements), did not have homicidal or suicidal overtones. Until
the first cases of suicide-bombing occurred in 1996, conferment of the posthumous honorific
title of "martyr" usually had as its basis the subject's own victimisation, at least by external
calculations of "cause" and "responsibility."1 As such the title was a euphemisation of deaths
caused by agents of the Israeli occupation and/or one of its civilian "arms" (Jewish settlers or
collaborating Palestinians), and of deaths which resulted from the structural circumstance of a
military occupation and the uprising against it. It was not necessary to have been killed in the
line of "action" conceived in a formally organised and externally recognised sense; nor was it
necessary to have killed. The fact that a person had stayed put in the territories despite the
prevailing economic and political circumstances--that s/he had resisted the temptation to
emigrate--marked a person as a samid, a practitioner of "steadfastness" or sumud. And sumud
counted as a weighty form of resistance activism in its own right. Thus, although persons
who died in militant actions were specially honoured and commemorated, many "martyrs"
had met their death not as a result of their own direct involvement in militant street actions,
but as "innocent bystanders" who had stepped in harm's way as they went about their daily
lives. As I elaborate later, during this phase in the Palestinian struggle, politically empathetic
external analyses (like local analyses of political process by intellectual elites) found it
relatively easy to work with select local/colloquial concepts, including that of martyrdom.
The suicide-martyrdom operations with which "martyrdom" (and indeed, Palestinian
activism) has latterly become synonymous2 combine attempts to cause carnage on the "other"
side with a readiness on part of the bomber to relinquish his/her own life to accomplish this.
The most objectionable aspect of these missions in all external and some critical inside views
(see, for example, Hamami & Budeiri 2001; Remmick 2001; Parry 2002),3 however, is that
they deliberately target Israel's civilian population. The differentiation between civilian
subjects (this category is in the "international" imaginary epitomised by "women and
children") and military personnel (associated with adult men) is fundamental to a
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discrimination in International Law (the Fourth Geneva Convention) between war crime and
the use of legitimate means of war. Most "global citizens" or "internationals" would not
dispute that in their view, too, the extent to which this critical boundary is transgressed marks
the difference between legitimate militant action on the one hand, and unacceptable
(although possibly understandable) acts of militancy, if not terrorism, on the other hand.4
Thus, with this new form of exercising militancy and martyrdom, a discordance has arisen
between active Palestinian values and the sensitivities of international solidarity supporters
which is registered in recent epistemological moves which effectively eclipse popular local
understandings, as I go on to explain. Recent calls to give greater emphasis to "other,
concurrent forms of activism," where dissenting voices among the local intelligentsia are
concentrated (Hamami & Budeiri 2001), are an example of a sudden desire to separate the
terms of analytical knowledge from (certain) activist knowledge practice, and one means of
accomplishing it. Another, I suggest, are mechanical explanations which ventriloquise the
actor's "p.o.v".
It is not the case, however, that Palestinian nationalist activists and international
solidarity supporters did not previously come up against some possible limits to
"international" collaboration. Not surrounding the manipulation of "martyrdom" (for which,
as I go on to show, both sides had their uses), but surrounding what in retrospect appear to be
"lesser" instantiations of a readiness on part of the Palestinian culture of activism (at a time
when the "progressive movement" exercised great influence over it) to use "violence" to
achieve national justice. Many dedicated and seasoned solidarity partners were
uncomfortable, for example, with the use of coercive means to bring non-compliant shopkeepers in line with boycotts and general strikes which the UNLU (United National
Leadership of the Uprising) called for.5 There was even greater general unease about the
strong-arm policy used against Palestinian "collaborators," which extended to execution
when other measures of correction (verbal warnings, social ostracism, and destruction of
property) had allegedly failed.6 Yet, resident foreign nationals (or "internationals," as they
have recently called themselves) many of whom supported the Palestinian cause
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professionally (as employees of various NGOs and Human Rights organisations in the area)
opted to turn a politically considerate "blind eye." For example, associates of various human
rights organisations said they were not including acts of political violence which were
perpetrated by Palestinians against other Palestinians (i.e., killings of collaborators) in their
statistical counts.7 When I say politically considerate, I mean to say that the reported
approach--statistical obviation--reflected the supportive foreign nationals' understanding that
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was to a great extent a public relations war and "war of
representations." Since the very beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, both sides have
depended on extensive moral and material support from powerful external parties-cumpartners,8 the flow of which was presumed (on both sides) to be influenced by the third
party's views of the protagonists' moral case and conduct. This has led both sides to invest
efforts in international impression management.9 The damage which attention to violent
streaks in Palestinian activism was expected to inflict on Palestinians' "national reputation"
and to the realisation of an independent state spoke against immediate corrective interference.
The foreign activists I met practised or supported the deferment of tutelage until such a time
when an independent state was established (which seemed imminent). It seemed a more
appropriate framework, and a fairer choice of moment, in which to encourage the adherence
to global standards of justice in local political culture. Palestinian interlocutors were aware of
their internationalist colleagues' political sensitivities and made efforts to keep "difficult"
differences out of their interactions.
Where "martyrdom" was concerned, however, earlier analytical practices had shown
themselves sympathetic to its creative uses at all levels of local practice, and were not averse
to making also good analytical use of it. Even mild sceptics saw no harm in letting the notion
be and "do its work" so to speak. After all, looked at from a politically empathetic view, it
was doing no harm; even non-believers could appreciate it as a useful conceptual play on
dismal and desperate material circumstances which had the effect of symbolic Selfredemption and psychological empowerment. A significant number of social and political
science analyses even reiterated the celebratory spirit in which the phenomenon was locally
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transacted.10 That is to say, they used martyrdom as a productive analytic by means of which
otherwise innocuous, if not counter-indicative data sets could be transformed into evidence of
significant changes in social and political practice which one had hoped to find or to achieve
by scholarly means, amongst others.11 In other words, the analytic of "martyrdom" was an
asset not only for the Palestinian nationalist project and its subsidiary agendas (e.g., the
feminist or "class" struggle), but also for various "internationalist" agendas which have
worked "with" the Palestinian cause since the 1970s.
Internationalist feminism serves a case in point. Feminist analyses12 could
manipulate "martyrdom" in its earlier guise to contrive greater "agency" for Palestinian
women.13 ("Active women" in turn made the national liberation movement's positive
influence visible.) Even the Palestinian women's committee associations, which were handing
political observers a ready-made case for Palestinian women's "transformed" status as a result
of the popular uprising, built around "women's committee" involvement as their centre-piece
of evidence, were reaching for "martyrdom" as a supplementary field of data with which to
engulf (actually and representationally) the masses of rural and working-class women active
political participants.14 One might well ask how Palestinian women come to have a share in
the credit for "acts of martyrdom," in both socio-political and analytical estimations, when
the majority of celebrated martyrs were male youths. One could simply gather up and
reiterate analytically parts of diverse local discourses and practices which hinted at a kind of
"cross-subjective" enablement of male activists (and not only those who became recognised
as martyrs) by their mothers, sisters, and wives (see Jean-Klein 1997, 2000). It was by
applying or extending the politically active logic, not by some alternative logic, that diverse
subaltern categories acquired in analytical terms a share of "direct" or "connective" authorial
input into the course of events which were recognised as making a difference, an impact or a
point.15
I do not mean to suggest that external analyses had previously been more interested in
a systematic investigation of what Latour (1999) has called "actors' own world-building
abilities," for their own sake or range of "instrumentalities." It just so happened that at that
6

time, fractions of "local understanding" relating to activism generally, and to "martyrdom"
particularly, had the obvious appearance of a useful or instrumental analytic from the point of
view of the political projects the analysts were pursuing. In part this was because the
practical ontology of the phenomenon of this name was not (yet) morally offensive in the
"international" view and global "order of things." On the contrary, Palestinian victim-martyrs
occupied a moral high-ground in both local/colloquial understandings and in empathetic
outside analyses. But the ready instrumentality also had something to do with the fact that
martyrdom had already been rendered transactable in "worldly terms" through the work of
activist academic and intellectual circles locally, which otherwise spoke mostly in the
language of familiar, "global" analytical concepts and theories (see Jean-Klein n.d.[a]). The
agency of the "martyrs" themselves, that is, the conceptualisation of their deaths as acts, went
without saying for all.
Closed and Forbidden Worlds of Understanding
Ten years onwards, as Palestinian martyrdom has become synonymous with
homicidal political suicide, the desired "co-responsibility" of the masses of "grassroots"
actors and especially of women has turned from a cultural and analytical asset into a
liability.16 The main analytical response, I would maintain, has been to sociologically
disconnect "actors" from agency and more generally to morally absolve the local/colloquial
level. This manifests itself in explanatory "work" which actively brackets--one might even
say, obviates--the need for ethnographic expansion and respective analytical "complication."
Maybe out of political consideration, or perhaps remaining true to the analysts' own political
desire, serious and empathetic efforts to "explain" the phenomenon of "martyrdom" under the
current circumstances have settled for a relatively simple and stable loop of mechanically
interlocking "factors" or "angles"--the political, historical, psychological, sociological, and
the biographic--which constitute the unique specialisms of assorted academic disciplines
and/or their methodologies. Note the missing elements: "culture" and "ethnography." It is as
if under certain conditions, people's actions--their readiness to act in a certain way--become
so utterly overdetermined by their "objective historical forces" that analysis can (or is it that it
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"had better"?) dispense with "actors' own" or with "local" understandings--or whatever
alternative term anthropologists nowadays use to refer (anti-)essentially to "culture"
(Erickson 2002), as a relevant analytical category. It is telling that it took no time at all and
little extra effort (not much fresh research) to assemble a strikingly rounded, complete and
confident picture. There is no sense, in this field of knowledge production, of a shortage or a
"failure" of knowledge.17 Politically empathetic knowledge practice seems self-assured and
focused on a different kind of failure, elsewhere: the failure of "own" available knowledge to
assert itself in a drastic change of the established political order.
One can almost speak in the singular, but not quite. However, it is not multifarious
theoretical or discipline-specific "perspectives" which cause debate. There is no academic
debate,18 that is one of my points. What looks like oppositional "analytical" tendencies are
"practical expressions" of political opposition. In later sections I expand on the opposed
modes of explanation; here I merely want to name them in accordance with my own heuristic
purposes and analytical focus. I call one explanatory "movement" hostile19 and the second
"empathetic" or "responsible." The quotation marks around the qualifying terms for the
second, which is the movement with which I am mainly concerned (because I consider it the
academically more serious one), signal my contention that while constituent works might be
successfully managing, still, to exercise political empathy with the Palestinian cause as a
whole, it does not and cannot also exercise analytical or aesthetic empathy in the Batesonian
sense20 with the actors and the processes at issue.
However, are not the politically responsible analyses, in so consistently and may I say,
conspicuously by-passing "actors' own understandings," casting a shadow of an alternative
way of reckoning the value of "martyrdom" which they must at least presume to be there and
take to be difficult to transact internationally, even if its source and nature is not explained ?
The "shadow" of an (untoward) form of reckoning value in regard to militancy, including the
recent suicide-martyrdom bombings, becomes very noticeable in the inordinate amount of
attention given to refuting the "prior knowledge" and moral endorsement of suicide bombings
by the bombers' immediate families. One could say it is about the only "culturally unique"
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feature about this analytical industry. It is as if it were (still) known or claimed somewhere
that these subjects or relationships formed a part of the "network of actants and actors" (cf.
Law 1999, Latour 1999) responsible for producing activists, martyrs, and suicide-bombers.
Where? Whose knowledge is this?
My aim is not to take away from the existing explanation(s), nor necessarily to add a
perspective. I want to turn the explanations, most especially in the "empathetic" strand with
its implicit claims about the nature of "correct" anthropological analysis in relation to hyperpoliticised fields, as an object of ethnographic and analytical interest in its own right. The
compulsion to actively --that is, as an act of political activism--obviate the relevance of local
resources (while the intense analytical acrobatics that is performed around it pronounces them
active "network components") is one curious feature of this explanatory "movement."
Specifically, I mean the obviation of the militants-cum-martyrs' "own" agency (cf. Mahmood
2001) as well as the "connective" investment of immediate family members in the martyrdom
of a loved one.
The common anthropological impulse, when an overlooked or excluded perspective
become conceivable, has been to "retrieve" and instate it. I want to cast a shadow of what
surprising thing one might find if one followed this habitual analytical movement, by crossreading between slippages in the current "explanations" of martyrdom practices in the Second
Intifada, and ethnographic data relating to Palestinian militant activism which I collected
during the First Intifada. One would find that the obviation of familial, especially of maternal
input into the "production" of militant subjects (including martyrs), which marks the
politically empathetic analytic, is in a fashion repeated in local level discourses and to an
extent (intermittently we might say) by the key actors'. Thus, if one turned to the "actors"
with the hope of finding an entirely alternative perspective or analytical purchase, one would
be disappointed. But here this is not a sign that the subjects and the analyst share an
understanding of the practice as utterly mundane (cf. Riles, forthcoming)! Unexpectedly, a
new ethnographic subject, and a different historical inflection of culture, emerges: the selfexhibiting or self-documentary self, moving through daily interactions with a view to, or
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through the imaginary of, an extended trial situation in which the self is continually
delivering evidence against hostile external representations; and in doing so, disowns realms
of "own" agency (in exchange for other anticipated gains).
Regardless of their political incorrectness, then, to the extent that hostile
representations evidently influence, not to say, compel narrative practices all around--and I
am suggesting the extent is considerable--they are analytically of some relevance. Let us then
look at the concrete charges. Already during the First Intifada (when no centre of political
authority could be identified which might be charged single-handedly influencing Palestinian
youths "adversely"), there circulated allegations in the Israeli and the international public
sphere that Palestinian parents were "inciting" their own children to militancy. Subsequently,
in the interim period between the two Intifadas, the charge changed to allegations that the
Palestinian Authority, via state-controlled school curricula and broadcasting media, was
fanning the flames of hatred against Israel and "inciting" Palestinian children to political
violence.21 Finally, in reference to the Second Intifada, it is the PA along with the leaders of
influential religious movements who are cast in the role of "political parents" and charged
with cultivating and "sending" suicide-martyrdom bombers. The current Israeli prime
minister, Ariel Sharon, this year (2002) reiterated the charge in a poignant form when he said,
related to suicide/martyrdom bombings (and in defence of Israel's disproportionately violent
retaliatory incursions back into the Palestinian territories): "The violence will end when
Palestinian mothers stop teaching violence to their children!" An almost identical charge
against Palestinian mothers was levelled by the First Lady of the U.S., Barbara Bush, when
she asked in a speech during the summer of 2002, "Can I empathise with a [Palestinian]
mother who sends her children out to blow themselves up and kill other civilians? No!"
(cited in Alsous 2002, emphasis added.)22 --In all this it has gone unnoticed how unusual a
state it would indeed be if mothers, and not fathers (Delaney 1997) or State-fathers
(Borneman 2003), were the rightful owners of children and their sacrificial acts.
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The impact of such arguments in the international arena has not been lost on ordinary
Palestinian parents, including mothers. The question is, how do they position themselves in
relation to the hostile "framing" of their children's' and their own "agency" ?
Double Standards?
time: second intifada; type of action: a suicide-martyrdom bombing; narrative modality:
open encouragement & claims of co-ownership
'"We do not regret what happened. Every woman should encourage her son to do the same."
This statement was given by the mother of Izzadin al-Masri, the 23-year-old
Palestinian suicide-bomber who on 9 August 2001 blew himself up in a West Jerusalem
pizzeria by detonating the pack of explosives he had carried in his guitar case, killing
nineteen Jewish Israelis. The woman was responding to ITV News correspondent Gabi Rado,
who had pressed the parents to comment on their son's "martyrdom."23 (The women's own
words were buried underneath the English voice-over, so one could not make out which word
she had used to urge maternal "encouragement.") Most British viewers very likely expected
expressions of immense grief from the woman, maybe a condemnation of her son's action,
and would have found the reply shocking. Not only was she refusing to condemn the act, she
was suggesting she had actively encouraged her son and in this way had had a hand in the
deed (and his death). She made it sound like she had given, not lost a son. In her new status
as Mother of a glorious Martyr, moreover, she was calling on other mothers to do the same.
I myself felt jolted by the woman's statement, but not for what it disclosed. I had
become aware of this kind of posture, and of the kind of cross-subjective agency it
insinuated, in my observations of processes concerning the First Intifada.24 My own surprise
was that a Palestinian mother was conceding maternal "connectivity" so openly and
unapologetically. It seemed a curious moment in time to suspend or reverse the selfpresentation practices which had struck me during the First Intifada, which I want to recall in
greater detail. Even though Palestinian militancy did not yet imply the perpetration of
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violence, and Mothers of Martyrs were celebrated in local political culture and in politically
sympathetic or symbiotic academic analyses; women's presentations of the/ir maternal
contribution to the social "encouragement" of a readiness for militant action in Palestinian
youths (the social category at the forefront of street clashes) were characterised by much
social reserve, prescience, and indeed, semantic contradiction. As it turned out, the woman's
expression in 2001 of her moral support for her son's suicide-martyrdom mission in front of
foreign media cameras did not signal a reversal of this trend. It rarely presented itself again,
so directly, in the coverage of the spate of suicide/martyrdom bombings which followed; a
slippage, then, on someone's part.
One would have thought that the position(s) and sets of connections made by mothers,
fathers, siblings--at the level of everyday relationships, more generally, and as expressed not
necessarily in front of cameras but informally and "subversively," in the course of everyday
life--would at least arouse the interest of anthropologists. (And I am not suggesting that one
would find necessarily a unanimous resounding of the position expressed by this one
mother.) But while anthropologists have contributed to the surging industry of professional
and academic explanation which has developed around the phenomenon of Palestinian
suicide/martyrdom bombings, they have not commented in the terms of their own discipline's
unique analytical concerns, concepts, or methods. The scenario which was briefly flashed
before British news viewers, in any event, has not been given a serious and empathetic
hearing. In the discourses which give it a "presence," it is integrated into a context of
ethnographically unfounded (and in this sense arbitrary) hostile charges against Palestinians
and their sense of social morality, and becomes overdetermining. Alternatively, in the
discourses which are committed to assisting Palestinians in their national self-emancipation,
the truth-value of such "connections," which circulate as a defamatory allegation, needs to be
vehemently denied; and ethnographic qualification is besides the point. Either way, then, the
possibility features at the moment only "in the negative." The following photograph--initially
it was part of a photo essay published in The Washington Times, then it was circulated
electronically via The Digital Filmmaker,25 and from there was excerpted and distributed
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through various informal networks (from where it came my way)--gives a compelling
demonstration of the hostile political-analytical position and its use of the trope of maternal
"collusion," and of a difficult ethnographic subject:
[Insert PHOTO/Image of Web-Page]
The following message accompanied and "framed" the electronic circular of the snapshot:
"Can anyone imagine a Jewish mother encouraging her son to explode himself like this
loving Om Mohammad?"
I now want to switch to a different ethnographic time frame, and to show the "shifting
presentation practices" which I encountered during the First Intifada. I then take the creative
liberty of treating these materials, pertaining to a different time and to less pernicious forms
of militancy, as a close-enough ethnographic basis for postulating that actors in their own
(self)knowledge practices might be intermittently repeating the obviation of "actors' own
knowledge practices" which we see exercised in politically committed analytical activity
related to Palestinian suicide/martyrdom operations. In the final section, I consider what
evidence of a radically different but rigorously obviated form of relating to the
suicide/martyrdom missions is recorded between the lines of analyses that strive to disown
the martyrs and their immediate relatives of "own agency." Undoubtedly, it would be
irreconcilable with hegemonic "global" sensitivities. Does that rule out a place for it in
ethnography?
time: first intifada (1990);type of action: militant activism; narrative modality: shifting
(discursive denouncement & encouragement in practice)
This section aims to show how Palestinian mothers in their interactions with each other
shared an understanding of their own animatory influence, and "co-ownership," with regard
to the courage which their male youths were displaying by participating in militant street
confrontations. This influence (viewed through the optic of proud mothers) centered on their
elicitation of courage from their sons (and form daughters in many cases) during everyday
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child socialisation practice. Studying these practices, it appears that mothers first of all led
their children to be "irritated" by the prevailing situation of political domination. From there
they led them to fear or rather, carefully calculate confrontation with the adversary; as well
as to over-ride or master fear for their own life (this-worldly existence) in the active defence
of a greater purpose or cause (qadiyat). The courage and sacrificial spirit which women
displayed in their nurturing practices set an example which both already foreshadowed the
nurtured subject's ideal future character and compelled or obliged his actualisation of it.
Palestinian mothers were never suggesting, nor am I, that they were single-handedly
responsible for the courage displayed in the current situation, or for and the form its display
took. Their practical presentations of their own input portrayed it as working together with
the animatory force of the Situation, il-wadec, a concept which summed up the various
"historical forces" which, as we will see, the "empathetic" explanation is taking into account.
This way of situating their input meant that in their intermittent obviation of it they were not
so much shifting to a different regime of "truth" as shifting representation by momentarily
foregrounding other animatory influences.
This presentational alternation, between denying and owning up to own responsibility,
between backgrounding and foregrounding maternal influence (which I take as testimony of
how widespread the understanding was that the Palestinian movement depended on
international good-will and support and what international sensitivities were), cut across
differences of class and different levels of formal (academic or political) education.
Moreover, the self-conscious denials were not rare or minor rituals, even though they were
largely aimed at an international audience. Quite simply, the "international" was not remote
enough. Various social and professional categories of "international" observers and residents
with a variety of interests were, and remain, a significant presence-cum-institution in this
field (Jean-Klein 2002). If for no other reason, the self-disclaiming discourse had become a
rather permanent adjunct of daily self-presentation practices.
My first ethnographic case is a conversational exchange during an English class I
taught in 1990 to a dozen girls and women who were members and friends of one of the four
14

progressive women's committee associations which were active at the time. We always
opened the conversational practice with a "Show & Tell--News of the Week" session. One
day, a student brought to class an article from a local paper. (Rada was in her late 20s, came
from an urban and professional family, had a university degree and was married to a
professional; she also belonged to the higher ranking cadre of her women's committee
organisation.) The article reported that the Israeli papers were condemning Palestinian
parents, especially mothers, as inhumane because they were sacrificing their own children,
ordering them to throw stones at Israeli soldiers and settlers and in this way getting
themselves shot. The Hebrew papers, the women and girls educated me, were in this way
questioning Palestinians' humanity: "What kind of human beings are capable of such a thing
[sacrificing their own children]?" the writer was quoted to have asked, rhetorically. The
whole class showed itself outraged at the accusation. In making Palestinians look like
animals, the class explained, Israel was undermining the legitimacy of the Palestinian demand
for an independent state. Palestinian mothers loved their children like any other mother and
were not doing such a thing, they protested.
Several turns further along in the conversation, however, when it seemed that the
concern with hostile representations had momentarily receded into the background, the same
woman who had brought the article to class felt prompted to recount the following incident in
which she and her three-year-old son had recently been involved. The women and girls had
just done the rounds of telling which heroic feats by Palestinian youths and "strike forces"
they had witnessed or heard of during the past week (something which was a common ritual
or routine in everyday gatherings too).
I was walking with my 3-year-old son. As we walked we passed [an Israeli] jeep which was parked just
outside [a] supermarket. When we passed, my son threw a little stone at it; just a little stone--he has seen
other boys do it too. [I.e., "It was not who I taught him to do that."] Just then one of the soldiers was coming
out of the shop, and he saw my son. He then came up and offered my son a biscuit. I told my son not to take
the biscuit, because the man giving it was an Israeli soldier. "Why don't you let the child have a biscuit?"
the soldier asked me. I said, "Our children must learn young." The soldier called me a "crazy woman"!
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[Note that the adult analogue of someone accepting gifts from Israeli soldiers would have been a
collaborator.]

For some time afterwards my son still thought that Israeli soldiers were "sweet." Then one day, he was
looking down the balcony of our flat and he saw Israeli soldiers patrolling the street. He made this sign [she
indicated the boy had made the V-sign with his fingers] and shouted down, "PLO! Israel, no!" He has seen
other kids do this. One soldier heard him and spun around, pointing his gun at my son. He was going to
shoot, I think, but just then another ran up to him and pushed his arm down. "Well, be careful in the future!"
the first soldier called to my son. "You see!? What did I tell you? Israeli soldiers are not sweet!" I said to
him. Now when my son sees an Israeli soldier, he still only whispers "PLO! Israel, no!" He has learnt to be
careful. And yesterday he said to me, "Yamma, the Jewish [soldiers] are not sweet!" after we passed a
soldier. --You see, the child has learnt.

It was other class members' reception of their colleague's tale which led me to recognise that
the woman might have just "shown" her hand in eliciting the new and welcome dispositions
from her son--resenting the occupiers but being careful (not headless) in the expression of
resentment--while working with "the circumstances" that had presented themselves. The rest
of the girls and women clapped and cheered, the mother and the boy. The performance of the
tale and its reception then suggested that despite everything, women also liked to think they
were playing an important part in their sons' political mobilisation, and took creative pride in
their contribution to it. (But let us remember that at the time, "militancy" still articulated
productively or positively with the "value-finding" [see Bateson 1987] interests of the
international solidarity movement.)
The social recognition which had been transacted in a very subtle manner during this
exchange had been brought home to me more forcefully in a different context, whilst
observing my friend Nuha's dealings with her sons. Nuha, 32, was married to a car-mechanic
(she herself was not gainfully employed), and had four sons aged one, nine, eleven and
fourteen. The family lived in el-Bireh, near the house of Nuha's parents, and I was regularly
spending time at both homes. In the initial phase of our friendship, I often asked Nuha if she
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was not worried that her older sons were spending so much time outside the house without, it
had seemed to me, her knowing where they were. "They know how to take care of
themselves," she would appease me. Then one day, when I asked again, she elaborated. Her
face lit up with mischievous excitement as she reported: "Yesterday afternoon, the older two
managed to [hit] some Jewish soldiers with stones! Just outside here [she pointed down at the
street below her balcony]. And they got away!" She wore a broad smile, seeming proud of
their escapade (they had outwitted the much stronger opponents) and teasing me with her
pride. Assuming a graver face expression and tone of voice, she continued: "Last week,
Hamada here [with her head she gestured in the direction of her nine-year old who was at
home that afternoon, watching TV in the living room], threw stones at some soldiers; he was
not so lucky. He didn't get away on time, and one of the soldiers grabbed hold of him and
slapped him across the face several times. Maybe he was lucky, because they then let him go.
He came home shaking, and I said to him, "You have to take care! [Deer balak!]" She
paused, and for a moment I thought she might tell me that she had told the boy off for his
involvement, as I occasionally heard women tell each other they were doing. (I never actually
saw a mother tell her son[s] off, although mothers might tell their sons that they "feared for
them" or relate dreams they alleged to have had of something specific happening to them--an
arrest, a betrayal, an injury--which boys took on board as a sign that they needed to be extra
cautious and circumspect for a while). Instead, Nuha went on to report that she had given her
son concerned encouragement , "You have to get quicker! Learn from your brothers!" She
studied me closely as she related this conversation with him, as if she expected me to launch
an objection.
A few weeks later, we were sitting in the kitchen where Nuha was preparing food for
her one-year old. The boy was sitting in his high-chair, entertaining himself with plastic toys
which he kept throwing against the refrigerator whilst we chatted. Nuha now went across to
the little boy, collected his toys from the floor, and handed them back to him together with
playfully fierce verbal encouragement, "Throw them, throw them at the Jews. Hit the Jews!
[Idrab al-Yahud!]"26 When she saw the vigour with which the boy obliged her she laughed.
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"Even this one here already throws little stones!" she then remarked, boastfully almost. "He
does!" she insisted, when she saw my incredulous look (the boy could not yet walk). "Last
week he threw little pebbles at a soldier, from his push-chair! The soldier scolded me for it,
telling me to control him! As if one could stop them!' In saying this she had just issued a
denial of her own (or any third party's) input; even though I had already been let in on ways in
which she was actively nurturing a militant disposition in her sons. But even as she said this,
Nuha picked up the thrown toys and handed them back to the little boy, continuing her
instruction, "Yalla, take another stone and hit that soldier!"
The woman in my English class had omitted to say that she, alongside her older sons
and their peers, had taught her toddler to make the V-shape, to recite the slogan when he saw
Israeli soldiers, and ultimately to distrust and fear them. It is possible, even likely, that in the
company we had been in this went without saying. But what is one to make of the explicit
(self-)denouncement? It suggests that many ordinary women acted even in their everyday
rounds on an understanding that there was no recognition, certainly no honour, attached to
this form of female accomplishment in the international arena). In suggesting a sense of coownership and pride I am not denying that women (like the youths) also harboured feelings
of apprehension, anxiety and fear for their children's physical safety (which they also
expressed); or, that they experienced pain when their sons and daughters were injured or
killed (which was then very dramatically and publicly displayed). They cared for their
children; but en-couragement--the nurture of courage in another--was one form of caring for
that person.
A small incident which I observed in 1990 in a craft co-operative shop run by one of
the progressive women's committee associations helps to ethnographically retrieve an explicit
expression of this creative pride. It is perhaps ironic that it was a group of four young
European students--the sort of interlocutor which usually elicited the denouncement--who in
this case elicited an explicit assertion of it from the educated attendant of the craft-shop. (Ipso
facto the episode shows that internationalist feminist observed recoiled, even then, from
forms of "women's participation" which implied their own consignment of their "life-giving"
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skills to a sacrificial martial economy.) The group was looking around the shop as part of
their "tour of Palestinian women's committees"27 when a twelve-inch tall plastic statue
caught their attention. It depicted a womb which housed a mature foetus which, its sex
indeterminate, held a Palestinian flag in the left hand and a stone clenched tightly in the fist
of its right hand. In short, it was a shockingly literal visual rendition of the baten askeriy or
"military womb" motif which one could also hear verbally exhorted both in political rhetoric
and among women themselves in the midstream of their daily interactions. The European
students were visibly repulsed by the object, and called over the shop-assistant to ask her why
the women involved in the co-operative scheme might be crafting such a thing. Had it been
their own idea, or was it crafted after someone else's? Who would buy it? The shop-assistant
(who later said she had been asked this question before) explained politely that, yes, the
women had themselves had the idea for this design, and that the object showed that
Palestinian women were proud to be mothers of Children of the Intifada, Children of Stones.
The visitors exchanged meaningful glances but made no further comments until they were
out the door, when allusions to "false consciousness" were faintly audible inside. Even in
those times, it was rare for Palestinian interlocutors like this shop-assistant, who was
educated and knowledgeable about international solidarity visitors' sensitivities, to refuse to
"correct" or disown the colloquial understanding accordingly. But let us take notice of the
European observers: in a sense it did not matter that the woman had confirmed that the
women craft producers were the artistic creators of the relief and the creative authors of the
process depicted by this political art-object. Even if the makers of the statues had been there
themselves, and had they testified to their own authorial authority: the observers would very
likely have persisted in their own understanding that these women were being manipulated
and "instrumentalised" in a political scheme of largely male design and patriarchal interest.
Such is the globalising, homogenising effect of analytic forms such as, for example, "false
consciousness."
time: early months of the Second Intifada; type of action: youngsters at the forefront of
militant street confrontations; narrative modality: denial of militants' own & parental
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agency (Palestinian "NGO" cum "civil society" leaders ventriloquise for Palestinian
"grassroots")
An article published by the Media Monitor Network28 during the second half of the first
year of the Second Intifada--just before the world saw an upsurge in suicide/martyrdom
bombings--suggests that the unreserved public admission by the mother of Izzadin Masri of
her (self-understood) maternal en-couragement, had caught a rare attitude on camera. In the
opening section, sub-titled "The Loss of a Child," the report read (all emphases are added):
Someone draped a flag around Mohammad Abu Rahman Mahfuz's mother as she waited in silence for the
body of her 15-year-old son to be brought home for a final good-bye before proceeding to the gravesite.
Deep in sorrow of mourning, she barely seemed to notice [the honour]... Shot by Israeli soldiers during a
rock-throwing demonstration in their refugee camp, her son would receive a martyr's funeral. All she could
feel, however, was the eternal emptiness that losing a child brings. [I.e., not joy or pride, which the local and
ideal view attributes to, and some analyses would say, demands from the mother of a martyr].

[...] Families face the dual pressures of trying to keep their children safe while supporting the national
struggle. "The pressure is greatest on women," said Aitemad Muhanna of the Gaza Women's Empowerment
Project. "Of course we all know that 'theoretically' we change our situation through 'national struggle,' but in
reality we are afraid for our children to participate in the clashes."[...]

Israeli allegations that Palestinian parents push their children toward martyrdom by encouraging them to
throw stones at the army particularly have angered Muhanna. "There are many things pushing these
children into martyrdom," she said, "but the idea that any mother would risk her child's life is absurd. I push
my children to get an education, to raise their awareness of Palestinian history--this is our tool of struggle
and the way to gain independence."

According to Muhanna, many of the young martyrs come from poorer families whose circumstances make it
difficult for parents to keep children safely at home. She cited the example of a refugee family with 8
children, whose father works all day and whose mother is too busy with the smallest children to keep a close
eye on the older boys, who go to throw stones after school. [...But] Muhanna made it clear that the risks cut
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across socio-economic segments...A well-educated and relatively well-off friend [of hers] ...was unable to
prevent her son from taking part in the clashes after a close friend of his was injured. [...] "I would never tell
my son to go, but he says he wants to do something" [Muhanna says]..."I can tell my children not to go
throw stones, but the children will make their own decisions."

Under the section-heading "Traumatized Children," the report continued,
...Rawiaa Hamam, a psychologist-social worker at the Gaza Community Mental Health Project, read from
the essay of a 14-year-old boy: "In the first intifada I was five. I remember when the Israeli soldiers came
into our house and lined up my father and brothers. They hit my father and I don't forget that. Now I want to
revenge my father's dignity. My father locks the door because he doesn't want me to throw stones, but I
climb out the window.'" [Hamam says,] "Some [boys] actually say they want to be martyrs...while others are
afraid.' [...] One boy took his religious brothers as role models... "I want to be a martyr like my brothers."
Another boy went to throw stones even though he was afraid. When Hamam [the social worker] asked him
why he went, he explained that he was picking olives with his family when the other boys asked him to come
and throw stones. At first he told them no, but when they started calling him a coward he felt obliged to
participate.

The statement shows Palestinian professionals active in the transfer of responsibility
for nurturing a militant disposition to the point of a readiness for martyrdom (it still meant
only deaths resulting from involvement street actions), away from the parents and from the
injured or killed boys themselves and towards a web of direct and indirect structural
"influences" which originate, in the final analysis, in the occupation and the occupiers'
persistent and violent repression of Palestinian national aspirations.
Less than a year later, a concerned observer (Rev. Sandra Olewine, United Methodist
Liaison, Jerusalem) still found it necessary to defend Palestinian mothers against the
categorical attribution, in hostile counter-national narratives, of an excess of "agency" to
them--now with respect to the phenomenon of suicide/martyr bombers: "One of the most
painful expressions of ...."inhumanity" has been the various ways in which Palestinian
mothers have been portrayed as somehow less than other mothers around the world, as if
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some different blood flows through their veins." Rev. Olevine was referring to damning
comments made by Mrs. Barbara Bush.29
time: second intifada; type of action: suicide bombings; narrative modality: neo-liberal &
right-wing ventriloquism of "the local"
The reason I cited the analysis by a politically "progressive" Palestinian professional and
Civil Society activist at such length is that it documents the U-turn in the political and
analytical reception of "martyrdom" just before its practical meaning shifted from Palestinian
youngsters standing up against a technologically superior military machinery without letting
fear of injury, arrest, or death deter them,30 to young people volunteering "in the hundreds"
to serve or act--the appropriate verb is one of the debated issues--as unstoppable human
bombs against Israeli civilian targets.31 As such it foreshadows the analytical dispositions
which have become the hallmark of "empathetic" explanations of suicide/martyrdom
bombings in "international" analyses. The first is the determined disconnection of familial
relations and even of the "martyrs" themselves--their honorary title and status now suspended
in quotation marks--from "agency." The second, and complementing the first, is the retreat
to a mechanical explanation, of actor-reaction. In this section I want to elaborate on the
terms of both of the polemically opposed analytical positions, the hostile or cynical and the
"empathetic." The promulgation of a mechanical model of action-precipitation is an
unexpected commonality between them (also shared by a recently mooted "third" position).32
Their main difference, analytically, lies in the specific mechanisms they centrally implicate.
None has the analytical interest viz. courage to acknowledge actors' courage as an
ethnographically and analytically relevant fact.
The reason I am calling the opposite of the "empathetic" explanation cynical is that this
modality is characteristically dismissive of the idea, which to the stress is a signature of the
"empathetic" arguments, that the unique historical and political circumstances--the protracted
and apparently unshakeable military occupation by Israel--have been a significant influence
in the "production" of suicide/martyr bombers. Instead, these analyses hold manipulative
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political leadership accountable. One might say, they favour a managerial and
Machiavellian approach (cf. Law 1999) wherein "actors" are reduced to more or less
ingeniously brainwashed (materially bribed as well as ideologically-spiritually manipulated,
as we will see) robotic "subjects" who follow the implicit suggestions if not explicit
directives from irresponsible or "insane" political and/or religious leaders. A well-known
statement by current US president George Bush is a poignant example of this brand of
politically instrumental and mechanical form of analytical reasoning. In what seemed an
historic speech heralding the hyper-power's intervention in the region's conflict with a
demand for restraint from both sides, also Israel, he ordered the Palestinian Authority and its
chairman, Mr. Arafat (italic emphases added):33
Stop inciting violence by glorifying terror in state-owned media, or telling suicide
bombers they are martyrs. They're not martyrs. They're murderers.
Similarly, this U.S. "expert on terrorism" applied a managerial model when he declared:34
Once upon a time, in the first years immediately following [the] first bombing in 1993, it
was a challenge [for field leaders for Hamas] to recruit suicide bombers [...They] had to
cajole--some might say brainwash--young men into believing that the rewards of
paradise outweighed the prospects of life on earth. But with the breakdown of the peace
process in mid-2000 and the start of the latest intifadeh that September, the martyr
wannabees started coming to Hamas--and they didn't require persuading.
Based on this excerpt alone, one might think the expert recognised the mobilising force of
historical processes--the breakdown of peace in 2000. But when he said the "martyr
wannabees" no longer required persuasion from Hamas leaders, he meant because "the TV
[started to do] that work for them;" and not because Palestinian TV stations were showing
Israeli forces inflicting violence on the Palestinian population, which a neo-liberal analysis
might stress; because of incitement to violence by PA leadership which TV programmes (just
as the PA was said to incite school children via its standard text-books).
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According to reified understandings in social analysis about which analytical concepts
lend themselves to political misuse (and which not), it is surprising that the stress on culture
is actually weak in the politically hostile modality. The reactive rebuttals by "empathetic"
counter-analyses often falsely attribute a "culturalist" emphasis, or falsely attribute an "old"
understanding of culture to what invocations of culture do appear (as an essential "given").
Maybe this is because it is the only critique of "culture," or the only political critique, we
have at our disposal? Certain is that anthropologists have grown accustomed to reciting it
mechanically, and are at a loss when it does not apply.35 Consider the following exchange
between a proponent of the hostile and one of the "empathic" analytical modality, following
the "Passover massacre" in a Natanya hotel (Ajami 2002). Under the sub-heading Culture of
Incitement:, the former wrote (the added emphasis is mine):
The man of Tulkarm [the bomber] did not descend from the sky: He walked straight out of the culture of
incitement let loose on the land, a menace hovering over Israel, a great Palestinian and Arab refusal to let
that country be, to cede it a place among the nations. He partook of the culture all around him--the glee that
greets those brutal deeds of terror, the cult that rises around the martyrs and their families.

Umm-al-shahid (the mother of the martyr), his mother will henceforth be known. Abu al-shahid shall be the
appellation of his father. Honest men and women will proclaim him and take him as their own, more sly
types will equivocate but then say that the good boy had been led there, all the way to Natanya, by the
Israeli occupation...

The leaders of the Palestinian Authority, most notably Yasser Arafat, the figure at the centre of this cruel
whirlwind, would issue a tepid condemnation and then let the world know that "armed struggle" and the
shahids, the martyrs, are writing glorious chapters in the annals of the history of that national movement....
[...] By omission and commission, Mr Arafat feeds this cult of terror, this affliction...

The e rebuttal by a professed "anthropologist living in Beirut" (Scheid-Idriss 2002) read:
[The author's] willfulness [sic.] to ascribe all political actions to culture is irresponsible. In waving the
language of cultural description, you blatantly ignore two concepts all contemporary anthropology
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necessarily includes: history and transnational interaction.36 We are long past the days of analyzing "culture
gardens." You cannot speak of "a culture of incitement" without discussing the neighbouring cultures of
incitement, such as the ultra-fascist, Jewish-exclusivist sections of the Israeli populace. Nor can you present
currently extant "ideologies" common to a group of people without looking at the events that cultivated
these ideologies....I find it shameful [for the author] to use [his] academic position to further what amount to
propagandistic writings

Surely, it is a Managerial-Machiavellian approach which we see the proponent of the
hostile position wave, or at least that is the meta-framework, with various other, not
necessarily compatible social science models being thrown in for good measure to account
for "subsidiary" connections which the meta-frame does not account for. Thus, the seductive
power of political leadership and its rhetoric, viz. the susceptibility of the "masses" to
political manipulation, is explained by appeal to a combination of tangible material, socioeconomic incentives and ideologically manufactured expectations of (intangible) spiritual
rewards in the next world and life. For example, most analyses mention "financial bonus
incentives," by which they mean the system of dawa (a network of mosques, schools,
orphanages, clinics, youth clubs, athletic teams and libraries) which the religious movement
Hamas has funded, and the "hardship support services" of which have come to include in
recent years payment of lifetime pensions ($300-$600 U.S. a month) to the families of its
suicide-bombers and of the health care and education costs of a bomber's children (if there
are any).37 As one journalist noted, cynically enough (and demonstrating the use of a
confusing blend of analytical metaphors):
The job of bomber comes with established cash bonuses and health benefits for the surviving family. How
else could the Palestinian boy or girl next door hope to be pictured on key chains and T-shirts?38

A Hamas activist in the West Bank added fuel (or ice) to this cold pragmatic view when he
concurred with the American journalist, "These guys [not only] kill Israelis [effectively], but
they also secure their families from poverty." (Ibid.)
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The "rational choice" model of explaining the political behaviour of "leaders" and
"followers" which was influential during the 1960s and 1970s, which resonates at the
subsidiary levels of this type of explanation, was later criticised for its oblivion to structural
constraints and power differences which are inherent in state power and/or in the class
structure (see Asad 1972). This is only half-true in this case, however; after all, there is
considerable stress on the "force" of Palestinian leaders. It is just that some, namely, the
historical forces which pre-date and surround the PA (which presumably add significantly to
the "rhetorical force" of the dawah system or of Chairman Arafat's oration), are left out of
the equation. (The PNA is inappropriately treated as a closed and self-organising system).
Historical forces such as the systematic de-development of the Palestinian sector under Israeli
occupation (1967-1996), the Palestinian economy's "hostage-to-Israeli-whims" predicament
still subsequently, and the massive economic destitution and general infrastructural
devastation wreaked by Israeli retaliatory campaigns recently. The opposite, "empathetic"
calculations of "motivation" give extensive and indeed exclusive emphasis to these
conditions. (In this approach the dawah is not a cold-calculated system of manipulation but
an commendable or at least necessary alternative network of community care and public
service provision which catches the fall-out from political violence, rather than precipitating
it.)39 The one thing the two opposed "traditions" have in common, however, is that neither
leaves enough room for subjective (and cross-subjective) calculations of "agency."
Almost as a last consideration, and without belief in the analytical relevance of this
level of information, hostile or "empathetic" analyses might rehearse the "potent"
eschatological rewards which "are said" (by influential religious and political figures) or
"believed" (by the masses), based on "Islamic" calculations, to accrue to martyrs and their
families. Among them that the sins of the martyr will be forgiven instantaneously, on
shedding the first drop of blood; that the martyr is assured a privileged place in paradise, at
the right-hand side of God; or that seventy relatives of the martyr gain admission to Paradise
with him/her.40 In as far as such calculations are not taken seriously analytically, none of the
modalities can be accused of using an over-determining, mechanical or essentialist view of
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the influence of "Islam" or, more specifically, of Islamic scriptures, on social and cultural
practice. Meaning, not even the cynical explanation is a naive freeze of old Orientalist
knowledge practices; on the contrary, it finds the post-Orientalist understanding helpful in
making its case. Briefly, post-Orientalist knowledge practice is a regionally-focused iteration
of critical and post-structuralist theoretical activity. Its major contribution has been to refute
earlier assumptions that sacred texts in and of themselves are the "cause" (and explanation) of
all observable practice among people who declare themselves "Muslims," practitioners of
Islam. Instead, the stress is placed on the mediatory influence of historically-specific social
and indeed political processes, notably interpretation and the dissemination and authorisation
of diverse interpretations. Especially in efforts to explain oppressive or violent political
practices, the dominant trend in critical, including Post-Orientalist analyses has been to cast
lay subjects or grassroots mechanically as unequal "partners" in textual interpretation, under
the influence of manipulative, if not coercive, authoritarian political and/or religious regimes
or figures. In this case, the PNA and/or (where "empathetic" explanations are concerned, it is
or)41 the leaders of Hamas and Islamic Jihad; but as well including, where the hostile view is
concerned, parents in the category of "pedagogic leaders" (rather than as part of the
manipulated masses). Without using the words, the hostile analyses attribute to the masses
(the practitioners and supporters of suicide-martyrdom bombings) a "false consciousness"
which combines irrational belief (in irresponsibly manipulated doctrine) with excessive
economic rationality. My point is, theoretical positions or analytical concepts are not in and
of themselves "hostile," "cynical," "empathetic," or "politically correct" (just as instruments
can be used to play a wide range of musical styles.) Their specific political charge arises from
the purpose or instrumentality for which they are manipulated, as well as from the care with
which they are handled. (Might the same be said for the knowledge resources which cultural
actors manipulate?)
Unusually, the providers of the politically empathetic explanation have held in check
the impulse which is normally associated with formerly "left" and latterly neo-liberal and
humanitarian political and social science analyses in dealing with situations where grassroots
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actors exercise political violence. They have refrained from invoking their own, Foucauldianinspired version of a managerial model that holds mostly leaders to account.42 As I said, they
have concentrated instead in the formative influence of the circumstance of the occupation.
Even commentators who do not spare the leadership of the religious movements remain
adamant that
[Primarily] the dangerous status quo of despair that exists in Palestinian society today--so deep and dark
that it has spawned the monstrous phenomenon of the secular suicide bomber--is primarily the responsibility
of Israel.. (Parry 2002, emphasis added).43

Notice that I also highlighted a reference to "despair" in this excerpt from an
"empathetic" explanation. I intend to draw attention to the secondary or subsidiary tendency
in this modality to psychologise the process of "local" and subjective mediation of structural
and political factors, in an effort to render it universally rational and human(e)ly
understandable. This tendency manifests itself in the formulaic invocation of a range of
emotive psychological concepts such as desperation, despair, hopelessness, frustration,
understandable rage, or desire for revenge. In this respect, too (as in its restrained
application of the Machiavellian approach), the analytical activity surrounding the Palestinian
suicide-martyrdom missions is out of character with the usual neo-liberal disposition. The
following excerpts give some examples of these terms in use:
Palestinians exist in an environment so dire that the prospects of death overshadow their prospects for life.
Suicide bombings are acts of desperation and mean that people have been pushed to the brink.44

The phenomenon of suicide bombers against civilians is [undoubtedly] tragic, immoral, and insupportable.
[But] a Palestinian child who watched the dreadful scenes in the camp of Jenin will probably not think much
before becoming the suicide bomber of tomorrow. The state of entire despair and the feeling that this young
generation has nothing to lose anymore should immediately come to an end.45

Such claims [that Palestinian school textbooks fan the flames of hatred and violent revenge to destroy
Israel] are simply an attempt by Israel to find some alternative explanation to [sic.] the understandable rage
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felt by Palestinians who suffered through decades of continuing dispossession, occupation,
disenfranchisement, violence, torture and humiliation at the hands of Israel.46

Even the faint concessions in this approach to strategic pragmatism47 are couched in these
terms. Thus, John Pilger described suicide-martyrdom as a "desperate attempt" to make up
"with what means one has at one's disposal" for the vast technological superiority of the
opponent.48 The most common form of empirical evidence used to measure the influence of
"rage" (leading to "understandable desire for revenge") is the frequency with which traumatic
events linked to the Israeli occupation crop up in the biographies of suicide martyrs or martyr
"wannabees," which are routinely searched for experiences such as the death or injury or
imprisonment and torture of a close family member or of a friend in either the First or the
Second Intifada; own experience(s) of humiliation and/or torture; or having generally
witnessed the violence of Israeli occupation, over a long period and/or extreme cases of it
(during recent campaigns as that on Jenin).49
Let us recall that the appeals to "revenge" as an explanation of social and political
action would normally (under any other circumstances, anywhere else in the Arab World, or
related to any other phenomenon in the current setting) be interpreted as either a failure to
distinguish local/colloquial and academic "theories of action"; or as the insinuation of a
"tribalist" an atavistic style of local/national politics, laying the analyst open to charges of
working in the Orientalist tradition. (Or both.) Curiously, this is not the case here. One might
say that just as the post-Orientalist wariness of "culture" does not impede and is even helpful
to the cynical analysis, what might otherwise count as a shard of old-Orientalist or of local
knowledge practice (the problem is, the concept is not much explained or theorised) has
slipped into the bag of resources with which "empathetic" commentaries attempt to absolve
the "actors" from responsibility and to redeem their moral subjectivity. (How they themselves
establish their own agency and morality in relation to these and other actions remains, in the
meantime, anyone's guess.)
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The families of martyrs, are absolved by determined efforts to put on the record their
lack of prior knowledge of a son's, daughter's, brother's or sister's suicide/martyrdom mission,
whereby the lack of knowledge serves as evidence of a lack of encouragement and support
from close ones. Thus, British news reports (both televised and printed versions) of the
suicide/martyrdom bombing in December 2001 by Maher Habashi, a 21-year-old plumber
from Nablus, made it a point to stress that the bomber's parents had said they had been
unaware of their son's intentions. The father had only learnt of his son's fate, it was
elaborated, when Hamas supporters came to the house to congratulate him.50 However,
while the father allowed himself briefly to be shown on camera (and to be "voiced-over"), he
did not speak to or for the camera. Generally, attempts to document parental sentiments and
attitudes rarely succeeded in capturing the parents' direct speech, and relied largely on
reported speech. The following report of the suicide/martyrdom bombing of a Jerusalem
commuter bus on 20.6.2002, attributed to Mohammed al-Ghoul, illustrates an exceptionally
forthcoming family. Note, however, that the mother and the sister, who feature centrally in
the photograph (holding up a large portrait and the degree certificate of the bomber), do not
speak.51 The report read:
His friends and family say in the days before his attack...he showed no sign of what he planned to do. He
watched the World Cup on television with his friends and his brother...Two weeks earlier he had attended
the wedding of his older brother...He seemed happy at the wedding, pestering his father about when he
would find a bride for him so he could marry, build his own house and start a family. Two days before he
died, he returned to the subject of his plans for his own household. That is why his family is so baffled by his
decision ...his father and brothers said they could not believe that he had killed himself. .."If he had asked
me for my advice I would have told him not to do it" [he father said]. His brother....agree[d]: "I would have
tried to stop him if I knew." The story that they tell is of a studious man hoping to earn a master's degree in
Islamic studies [...] "He said he did not like the idea of civilians being killed. But no one forced him to this.
He chose this route. He had a good life--a good upbringing" [said one of the brothers again.]

Both modalities, I wanted to show, are in their own theoretical fashion, and for
different political reasons, perpetuating a mechanical explanation. Both deny agency to
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"martyrs." The systematic obviation of the possibility that personal (and relational) effort,
and courage, might be required to elicit what is by all accounts an "extreme action" could not
be stated more explicitly than in the analytical assessment by a Gazan psychiatrist when he
said, "The difficult thing is not to become a martyr; it is how not to become a martyr."52
Meanwhile, however, there is considerable evidence, some of which I now want to bring into
the foreground, which indicates that the martyrs themselves and a considerable segment of
the Palestinian community make it a point to put the martyrs' own and specifically related
subjects' agency on record.
e. time: second intifada; type of action: suicide-martyrdom bombings; narrative
modality: proclamations of agency
Inadvertently, commentaries in both political-analytical modalities have supplied the outside
with data which the accompanying analyses do not explain (or not seriously). Glimpses of
moments when local actors assume and even proclaim agency, and claim it as a personal
asset of sorts, transpire more often in images than in words. Moreover, they have been
allowed to transpire mostly through the cynical analytic, which makes it that much more
difficult to engage seriously with them if one in not intent on political deconstruction (or coconstruction for that matter).
In the background of politically empathetic reports even, one sees that every martyr's
death invited a social gathering at the martyr's family home or, when the family home had
been destroyed as part of the Israeli campaign of "connective punishment," in a special
funerary tent (which to erect or attend was eventually also made illegal). There the family
would receive the condolences and congratulations from members of the community and
from party delegates. The families' own repeated viewing-and-showing of the video-recorded
statement of intent by their martyr with visitors are, or ought to be, a well-known
ethnographic fact because they frequently formed the backdrop against which journalists
were trying to interview the parents. It might stand as a fact, but what these processes stand
for (or "achieve") has yet to be seriously explained. As an anthropologist, I see a parallel
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between the social preoccupation with video-recordings evident here and that which I (and
others) have noted with respect to weddings. Wedding videos, too, are viewed again and
again by the bride's and groom's families with every new visitor who comes to convey
congratulations. Indeed, there are a series of parallels between martyr deaths and weddings
(which also have in common that each renders an event or an act which is normally
considered polluting--death in one case, sexual intercourse in the other--productive and
purifying). What is more, the connection was made explicitly in local/colloquial discourses
(in everyday talk, political rhetoric, and in various artistic forms) during the First Intifada, as
martyrs' funerals were referred to as "nationalist weddings" and (male) martyrs as "brides" in
relation to the homeland or to "the cause," its liberation (see Jean-Klein 1997, 2001). Other
parallels that have appeared are the formal and public reception of congratulations (which in
ordinary or mundane weddings may precede the marriage consummation); or the distribution
of sweets and firing of guns in communal displays of a celebratory spirit after the suicidemartyrdom bombings,53 which gestures mark the street celebrations of quotidian weddings
(and which had been with political deliberation suspended during the First Intifada); or the
formal (and proud?) public announcement of the person's (an family's) status change, as
recorded in this cynical news report (emphases in italics added):54
These days Palestinians celebrate the suicides in newspaper announcements that read, perversely, like
wedding invitations. "The Abdel Jawad and Assad families and their relatives inside the West Bank and in
the Diaspora declare the martyrdom of their son, the martyr Ahmed Hafez Sa'adat," reads a March 30 notice
for the 22-year-old killer of four Israelis in a shooting attack.

The analytically unaccounted-for and difficult to recount form of calculating losses and
gains sometimes turns up in the most unexpected information contexts. For example, in the
following assessment of women's participation in suicide-bombings55 as a step towards
women's greater social equality as part of a special report published in a Palestinian paper on
International Women's Day, authored by a progressive and feminist Palestinian
professional.56 The report intended to register the violence which Palestinian women were
suffering from Israeli occupation and siege (the early loss of a husband or father,57 or the
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abysmal economic circumstances) and from "disturbing components of Palestinian society"
(pressure on girls from their families to marry young, the concomitant forced discontinuation
of their formal education, and the expected practice of "marriage among relatives"--parallel
cross-cousin marriage--which the author says "stands in the way of a woman's freedom to
choose her life partner"). Then, taking stock of recent "gains," the author noted:
Although all these women [the interviewees] agreed that they have experienced tremendous problems
and violence, they also say that the Palestinian woman has proven her ability to bear responsibility.
This, they aver, is clear from her role in the struggle and in suicide operations against Israelis.

Afterthoughts
It has been said of anthropological work relating to the Arab World (see Abu-Lughod
1989) that it was for a long time stagnant analytically because it was ensconced in the task of
debunking the inadequate terms of knowledge production associated with an older and
politically compromised line of scholarship known as Orientalism. Ten years onwards it
appears the debunking is never finished; "the world" keeps recharging old and inventing new
Orientalist imaginaries, and the perpetually defensive analytical posture is also a restatement.
The ethnographic materials I have presented might suggest that a similar "inertia"58 might
have taken hold in local (self-)knowledge practice. Or perhaps the "stereo practice"--whereby
people act "locally" but intermittently frame local/own action in foreign terms--should be
recognised as a creative movement in its own right. The fact is that while we do know that
"agency" is in this case a negative asset and a huge liability and that this must problematise
the social transaction of "agency" (to that extent cultural practice and cultural analysis share a
similar problem), we know very little about how cultural practitioners attempt to resolve this
problem. I have tried to draw attention to the way cultural analysis has handled the problem.
My hope is that the present exercise will stimulate further reflection on everyday, activist,
and analytical knowledge practices and their intersections in politically charged settings.
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